NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Conforming and Non-conforming Peer Effects in Vaccination Decisions

Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Sarah Nowak, Raffaello Varadavas, Neeraj Sood

NBER Working Paper No. 19528
Issued in October 2013
NBER Program(s):   HC   HE

Traditional economic models of vaccination assume that agents free-ride on the vaccination decision of others. These models show that private vaccination rates are always below the social optimal and even large subsidies cannot achieve disease eradication. In this paper, we build a model where in addition to the desire to free-ride, agents have a desire to conform to the vaccination decisions of their peers. In this model privately optimal vaccination rates can be higher or lower than the social optimal and thus subsidies for vaccination are not always optimal. However, in certain cases, even small subsidies can achieve disease eradication.

download in pdf format
   (482 K)

email paper

The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this.  You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email.

This paper is available as PDF (482 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w19528

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Dee and Wyckoff w19529 Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT
Raff and Temin Sears, Roebuck in the Twentieth Century: Competition, Complementarities, and the Problem of Wasting Assets
Baicker, Finkelstein, Song, and Taubman w19547 The Impact of Medicaid on Labor Force Activity and Program Participation: Evidence from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us