NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators

David E. Bloom, Christopher L. Cavanagh

NBER Working Paper No. 1938
Issued in June 1986
NBER Program(s):   LS

This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal no evidence of strategic behavior.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w1938

Published: Bloom, David E. and Christopher Cavanagh. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, June 1986, pp. 408-422. citation courtesy of

 
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