An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators
David E. Bloom, Christopher L. Cavanagh
NBER Working Paper No. 1938
This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different
panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility
model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates
indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of
lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have
previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are
estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal
no evidence of strategic behavior.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w1938
Published: Bloom, David E. and Christopher Cavanagh. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, June 1986, pp. 408-422.
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