An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators

David E. Bloom, Christopher L. Cavanagh

NBER Working Paper No. 1938
Issued in May 1986
NBER Program(s):   LS

This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different

panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility

model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates

indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of

lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have

previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are

estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal

no evidence of strategic behavior.

(378 K)

(272 K)

Published: Bloom, David E. and Christopher Cavanagh. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, June 1986, pp. 408-422.

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