Migration into the Welfare State: Tax and Migration Competition
NBER Working Paper No. 19346
This paper provides overview of recent work on migration and welfare state tax policies: 1. I survey the literature on the tax burden of migration. 2. I empirically identify the differential effect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of immigrants across the two groups (the "free-migration" group and the "policy-restricted migration" group) in an unbiased way. 3. I outline the implications of the tax burden of migration to tax competition within a union, facing migration from the rest of the world.Each host country in a competitive regime balances on the margin these gains and losses from migration. In doing so, each country takes the well-being of the migrants as given. Therefore, It ignores the fact that a tax-migration policy that admits an extra migrant raises the well-being that must be accorded to migrants by all the other host countries, in order to elicit the migrant to come in; and more capital income leaks, through capital taxation, to immigrants.
You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format from SSRN.com ($5) for electronic delivery.
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w19346
Published: Assaf Razin, 2013. "MIGRATION into the WELFARE STATE: tax and migration competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 548-563, August. citation courtesy of
Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these: