The Incentive Effect of Scores: Randomized Evidence from Credit Committees
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Previously circulated as "The Incentive Effect of IT: Randomized Evidence from Credit Committees." We are grateful to Heski Bar-Isaac, Greg Fischer, Luis Garicano, Danielle Li, Ulrike Malmendier, Andrea Prat, Anjan Thakor, John Van Reenen, and the Arizona State University, Boston University, Columbia University, Darmouth College - Tuck School of Business, HEC School of Management, Imperial College Business School, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Helsinki Center of Economic Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School of Business, Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, Nova School of Business and Economics, Queen Mary School of Economics and Finance, Swiss Finance Institute - USI, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, University of Lausanne, University of London - Royal Holloway College, University of Namur, University of Oxford - SAID Business School, University of Toulouse, and Washington University seminar participants; and the CEPR Workshop on Incentives, Management and Organization, CEPR/AMID Development Economics Symposium, the NBER Corporate Finance Workshop, the NBER Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship Workshop, and the NBER Organizational Economics Workshop participants for helpful comments and discussions. We wish to thank BancaMia for their support, and Gustavo Caballero, Ximena Cadenas, Isabela Echeverry, Santiago Reyes and Lucia Sanchez for excellent research assistance. We thank IPA for the funding that made this study possible. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.