NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

David K. Levine, Salvatore Modica

NBER Working Paper No. 19221
Issued in July 2013
NBER Program(s):   EFG   POL

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their “exclusiveness” we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently “extractive” in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w19221

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