NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Incentive Contracts

Edward P. Lazear

NBER Working Paper No. 1917
Issued in May 1986
NBER Program(s):   LS

Labor relations involve incentive problems. The market solves these problems by developing a variety of institutions. This paper describes and assesses the various forms of incentive contracts.

download in pdf format
   (141 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (141 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w1917

Published: The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. vol.2,pp. 744-748, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman. The Macmillan Press Limited London, 1987

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Lazear w5672 Performance Pay and Productivity
Lazear and Rosen w0401 Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear w6957 Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions
Lazear w1299 Incentives and Wage Rigidity
Gibbons w5705 Incentives and Careers in Organizations
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us