Smokescreen: How Managers Behave When They Have Something To Hide
NBER Working Paper No. 18886
---- Acknowledgements -----
We are grateful to Martin Bugeja, Mike Burkhart, Ettore Croci, Daniel Ferreira, Paul Gilgen, Robert Guerrero, Simi Kedia, Peter Limbach, Daniel Metzger, Shiva Rajgopal, Daniel Sokol, and seminar participants at Catholic University of Milan, Cyprus University of Technology, University of Melbourne, New York University, University of Queensland, University of Technology Sydney, Warwick Business School, University of Western Australia, and the German Finance Association Annual Meeting in Wuppertal for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank John Connor for generously providing his extensive dataset of worldwide cartels, Jongsub Lee for generously providing his dataset of political contributions, and Ronald Masulis for generously providing his dataset of foreign independent directors. Part of this research was completed when David Yermack was a visiting professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tanja Artiga González was a visiting researcher at NYU Stern School of Business. Financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.