Estate Taxation with Altruism HeterogeneityEmmanuel Farhi, Iván Werning
NBER Working Paper No. 18792 We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies, depending on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specification of utility and social welfare functions. We propose a normalization that is helpful in classifying these different possibilities. We isolate cases where the optimal policy bans negative bequests and taxes positive bequests, features present in most advanced countries. You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format from SSRN.com ($5) for electronic delivery.
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