@techreport{NBERw18636,
 title = "Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts",
 author = "Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "18636",
 year = "2012",
 month = "December",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w18636",
 abstract = {The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties – political opponents, competitors, interest groups – while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.},
}