NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts

Marian W. Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller

NBER Working Paper No. 18636
Issued in December 2012
NBER Program(s):   LE

The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w18636

Published: 11. Third-party opportunism and the theory of public contracts: operationalization and applications Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller The Manufacturing of Markets Legal, Political and Economic Dynamics Editors: Eric Brousseau, Université de Paris IX (Paris-Dauphine) Jean-Michel Glachant, European University Institute, Florence View all contributors Date Published: May 2014 availability: Available format: Hardback isbn: 9781107053717

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