NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Misconduct in Credence Good Markets

Jennifer Brown, Dylan B. Minor

NBER Working Paper No. 18608
Issued in December 2012
NBER Program(s):   IO

We examine misconduct in credence good markets with price taking experts. We propose a market-level model in which price-taking experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm's brand and their own skill. We test the predictions of the model using sales complaint data for exclusive and independent insurance agents. We find that exclusive insurance agents working for large branded firms are more likely to be the subject of a justified sales complaint, relative to independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per year.

You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format from SSRN.com ($5) for electronic delivery.

Information about Free Papers

You should expect a free download if you are a subscriber, a corporate associate of the NBER, a journalist, an employee of the U.S. federal government with a ".GOV" domain name, or a resident of nearly any developing country or transition economy.

If you usually get free papers at work/university but do not at home, you can either connect to your work VPN or proxy (if any) or elect to have a link to the paper emailed to your work email address below. The email address must be connected to a subscribing college, university, or other subscribing institution. Gmail and other free email addresses will not have access.

E-mail:

This paper was revised on October 9, 2013

Acknowledgments and Disclosures

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w18608

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Gottlieb and Smetters w18601 Narrow Framing and Life Insurance
Danzon, Towse, and Mestre-Ferrandiz w18593 Value-Based Differential Pricing: Efficient Prices for Drugs in a Global Context
Kunreuther, Heal, Allen, Edenhofer, Field, and Yohe w18607 Risk Management and Climate Change
Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Zeldes w18575 What Makes Annuitization More Appealing?
Polinsky and Shavell w18594 Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us