Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote MarketsAlessandra Casella, Sébastien Turban
NBER Working Paper No. 18573 ---- Acknowledgements ----- We thank Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Tom Palfrey, and participants to the Leitner Seminar at Yale University and the Straus Fellows seminar at the NYU Law School for their comments; Antoine Arnoud for his help on Theorem 3, and Georgy Egorov for an illuminating discussion of Lemma 1. Casella thanks the National Science Foundation for its support (SES-0617934), Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques for its hospitality, and the Straus Institute at the NYU Law School for its support and hospitality. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. |

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