NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

How Do Regulators Influence Mortgage Risk: Evidence from an Emerging Market

John Y. Campbell, Tarun Ramadorai, Benjamin Ranish

NBER Working Paper No. 18394
Issued in September 2012
NBER Program(s):   AP   CF

To understand the effects of regulation on mortgage risk, it is instructive to track the history of regulatory changes in a country rather than to rely entirely on cross- country evidence that can be contaminated by unobserved heterogeneity. However, in developed countries with fairly stable systems of financial regulation, it is difficult to track these effects. We employ loan-level data on over a million loans disbursed in India over the 1995 to 2010 period to understand how fast-changing regulation impacted mortgage lending and risk. We use cross-sectional differences in the time- series variation of delinquency rates, conditional on initial interest rates, to detect the effects of regulation on mortgage delinquencies.

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A data appendix is available at http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w18394

This paper was revised on July 17, 2013

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w18394

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