NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance

David Autor, Mark Duggan, Jonathan Gruber

NBER Working Paper No. 18172
Issued in June 2012

---- Acknowledgements -----

We are grateful to Abby Alpert, Diether Beuermann, Andrew Garin and Pian Shu for excellent research assistance and to seminar participants at Boston University, Harvard, the University of Chicago, and Wharton for many helpful comments. We are especially grateful to a number of employees of our participating insurer for providing data and for many discussions about the functioning of the LTD market. Duggan thanks the Dean's Research Fund at the Wharton School for support of this research. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions or other individuals mentioned above, nor of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

---- Disclosure of Financial Relationships for David Autor -----

I have written policy overview papers for the following non-profit organizations that may have a policy interest in the contents of the current paper:

a. Brookings Institution: The Hamilton Project

b. The Center for American Progress

---- Disclosure of Financial Relationships for Jonathan Gruber -----

Jonathan Gruber is a member of the Commonwealth Health Connector Board that was responsible for setting the policies studied in this research.

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