Suffrage, Schooling, and Sorting in the Post-Bellum U.S. South

Suresh Naidu

NBER Working Paper No. 18129
Issued in June 2012
NBER Program(s):   DAE   ED   LE   POL

This paper estimates the political and economic effects of the 19th century disenfranchisement of black citizens in the U.S. South. Using adjacent county-pairs that straddle state boundaries, I examine the effect of voting restrictions on political competition, public goods, and factor markets. I find that poll taxes and literacy tests each lowered overall electoral turnout by 8-22% and increased the Democratic vote share in elections by 1-7%. Employing newly collected data on schooling inputs, I show that disenfranchisement reduced the teacher-child ratio in black schools by 10-23%, with no significant effects on white teacher-child ratios. I develop a model of suffrage restriction and redistribution in a 2-factor economy with migration and agricultural production to generate sufficient statistics for welfare analysis of the incidence of black disenfranchisement. Consistent with the model, disenfranchised counties experienced a 3.5% increase in farm values per acre, despite a 4% fall in the black population. The estimated factor market responses suggest that black labor bore a collective loss from disenfranchisement equivalent to at least 15% of annual income, with landowners experiencing a 12% gain.

download in pdf format
   (678 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (678 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w18129

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Hornbeck and Naidu w18296 When the Levee Breaks: Black Migration and Economic Development in the American South
Cascio and Washington w17776 Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965
Faden and Rausser Econometric Policy Model Construction: The Post-Bayesian Approach
Cheng and Hoekstra w18134 Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence? Evidence from Castle Doctrine
Nakamura, Sergeyev, and Steinsson w18128 Growth-Rate and Uncertainty Shocks in Consumption: Cross-Country Evidence
NBER Videos

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email:

Contact Us