Executives' "Off-The-Job" Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk
NBER Working Paper No. 18001
We examine how executives' behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low "frugality") and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that CEOs and CFOs with a legal record are more likely to perpetrate fraud. In contrast, we do not find a relation between executives' frugality and the propensity to perpetrate fraud. However, as predicted, we find that unfrugal CEOs oversee a relatively loose control environment characterized by relatively high probabilities of other insiders perpetrating fraud and unintentional material reporting errors. Further, cultural changes associated with an increase in fraud risk are more likely during unfrugal (vs. frugal) CEOs' reign, including the appointment of an unfrugal CFO, an increase in executives' equity-based incentives to misreport, and a decline in measures of board monitoring intensity.
This paper was revised on June 28, 2012
Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w18001
Forthcoming: Executives' "Off-The-Job" Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk, Robert Davidson, Aiyesha Dey, Abbie Smith . in Causes and Consequences of Corporate Culture, Zingales and Poterba. 2014
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