TY  - JOUR
AU  - Roussanov,Nikolai
AU  - Savor,Pavel G.
TI  - Status, Marriage, and Managers' Attitudes To Risk
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 17904
PY  - 2012
Y2  - March 2012
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17904
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17904.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Nikolai Roussanov
University of Pennsylvania
Wharton School,  Finance Department
2400 Steinberg-Dietrich Hall
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367
Tel: 215/746-0004
Fax: 215/898-6200
E-Mail: nroussan@wharton.upenn.edu

Pavel G. Savor
Finance Department, Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Tel: 215-898-7543
E-Mail: psavor@wharton.upenn.edu
AB  - Status concerns can drive risk-taking behavior by affecting the payoff to a marginal dollar of wealth. If status concerns arise endogenously due to competition in the marriage market, then unmarried individuals should take greater risks. We test this hypothesis by studying corporate CEOs. We find that single CEOs are associated with firms exhibiting higher stock return volatility, pursue more aggressive investment policies, and are not affected by increases in idiosyncratic risk. These effects are weaker for older CEOs. Our results also hold when we use variation in divorce laws across states to instrument for CEO marital status.
ER  -