NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns

Andrew Atkeson, Christian Hellwig, Guillermo Ordonez

NBER Working Paper No. 17898
Issued in March 2012
NBER Program(s):   EFG   IO

We study a market with free entry and exit of firms who can produce high-quality output by making a costly but efficient initial unobservable investment. If no learning about this investment occurs, an extreme "lemons problem" develops, no firm invests, and the market shuts down. Learning introduces reputation incentives such that a fraction of entrants do invest. If the market operates with spot prices, simple regulation can enhance the role of reputation to induce investment, thus mitigating the "lemons problem" and improving welfare.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17898

Published: Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2015. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 130(1), pages 415-464. citation courtesy of

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