NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds

Francesco Caselli, Thomas E. Cunningham, Massimo Morelli, Inés Moreno de Barreda

NBER Working Paper No. 17833
Issued in February 2012

---- Acknowledgements -----

We thank, for helpful comments, Navin Kartik, Meg Meyer, Ronny Razin, Francesco Squintani, and seminar participants at LSE, Zurich, Oxford, Edinburgh, and at the 2007 Summer School on Political Economy and Social Choice. Previous versions of this paper circulated with the titles ≪Incumbency Advantage and Supermajority Reelection Rule≫ and ≪Handicapping Politicians: the Optimal Majority Rule in Incumbency Elections≫. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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