NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence from the Reform of Figure Skating Judging

Eric Zitzewitz

NBER Working Paper No. 17732
Issued in January 2012
NBER Program(s):Law and Economics

Transparency is usually thought to reduce favoritism and corruption by facilitating monitoring by outsiders, but there is concern it can have the perverse effect of facilitating collusion by insiders. In response to vote trading scandals in the 1998 and 2002 Olympics, the International Skating Union (ISU) introduced a number of changes to its judging system, including obscuring which judge issued which mark. The stated intent was to disrupt collusion by groups of judges, but this change also frustrates most attempts by outsiders to monitor judge behavior. I find that the "compatriot-judge effect", which aggregates favoritism (nationalistic bias from own-country judges) and corruption (vote trading), actually increased slightly after the reforms.

download in pdf format
   (328 K)

email paper

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17732

Published: Eric Zitzewitz, 2014. "Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence From the Reform of Figure Skating Judging," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(1), pages 3-30, February. citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
Olken and Pande w17398 Corruption in Developing Countries
Banerjee, Mullainathan, and Hanna w17968 Corruption
Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis w17981 How much do firms pay as bribes and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide
Bai, Jayachandran, Malesky, and Olken w19483 Does Economic Growth Reduce Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Vietnam
Prendergast and Topel w4427 Favoritism in Organizations
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us