NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence from the Reform of Figure Skating Judging

Eric Zitzewitz

NBER Working Paper No. 17732
Issued in January 2012
NBER Program(s):   LE

Transparency is usually thought to reduce favoritism and corruption by facilitating monitoring by outsiders, but there is concern it can have the perverse effect of facilitating collusion by insiders. In response to vote trading scandals in the 1998 and 2002 Olympics, the International Skating Union (ISU) introduced a number of changes to its judging system, including obscuring which judge issued which mark. The stated intent was to disrupt collusion by groups of judges, but this change also frustrates most attempts by outsiders to monitor judge behavior. I find that the "compatriot-judge effect", which aggregates favoritism (nationalistic bias from own-country judges) and corruption (vote trading), actually increased slightly after the reforms.

You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format from SSRN.com ($5) for electronic delivery.

Information about Free Papers

You should expect a free download if you are a subscriber, a corporate associate of the NBER, a journalist, an employee of the U.S. federal government with a ".GOV" domain name, or a resident of nearly any developing country or transition economy.

If you usually get free papers at work/university but do not at home, you can either connect to your work VPN or proxy (if any) or elect to have a link to the paper emailed to your work email address below. The email address must be connected to a subscribing college, university, or other subscribing institution. Gmail and other free email addresses will not have access.

E-mail:

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17732

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Olken and Pande w17398 Corruption in Developing Countries
Banerjee, Mullainathan, and Hanna w17968 Corruption
Feng, Oppenheimer, and Schlenker w17734 Climate Change, Crop Yields, and Internal Migration in the United States
Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis w17981 How much do firms pay as bribes and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide
Fisman, Harmon, Kamenica, and Munk w17726 Labor Supply of Politicians
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us