TY  - JOUR
AU  - Roberts,James W.
AU  - Sweeting,Andrew
TI  - When Should Sellers Use Auctions?
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 17624
PY  - 2011
Y2  - November 2011
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17624
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w17624.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
James W. Roberts
Duke University
Department of Economics
213 Social Sciences Building
Durham, NC 27708
Tel: 919/660-1822
E-Mail: j.roberts@duke.edu

Andrew Sweeting
Department of Economics
213 Social Sciences
Box 90097
Duke University
Durham, NC 27708
Tel: 919 660 1883
E-Mail: atsweet@duke.edu
AB  - A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction. The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism would increase revenue and efficiency.
ER  -