@techreport{NBERw1759,
 title = "The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency",
 author = "Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "1759",
 year = "1985",
 month = "November",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w1759",
 abstract = {This paper addresses the optimal degree of law enforcement regarding tax evasion. It derives the conditions that characterize the optimal size of a tax collection agency, and then provides a simple interpretation of the conditions in terms of excess burden.The paper clarified earlier findings that suggest that the optimal size should be set higher than a simple cost-benefit calculation would indicate. It concludes with a numerical example that illustrates the optimality condition and demonstrates that a policy based on a naive cost-benefit analysis of the tax collection agency could result in a substantial overcommitment of resources.},
}