NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Optimal Monetary Policy with Informational Frictions

George-Marios Angeletos, Jennifer La'O

NBER Working Paper No. 17525
Issued in November 2011
NBER Program(s):   EFG   ME

We study optimal monetary policy in an environment in which firms' pricing and production decisions are subject to informational frictions. Our framework accommodates multiple formalizations of these frictions, including dispersed private information, sticky information, and certain forms of inattention. An appropriate notion of constrained efficiency is analyzed alongside the Ramsey policy problem. Similarly to the New-Keynesian paradigm, efficiency obtains with a subsidy that removes the monopoly distortion and a monetary policy that replicates flexible-price allocations. Nevertheless, "divine coincidence" breaks down and full price stability is no more optimal. Rather, the optimal policy is to "lean against the wind", that is, to target a negative correlation between the price level and real economic activity.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17525

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