NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Competition in Persuasion

Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica

NBER Working Paper No. 17436
Issued in September 2011
NBER Program(s):   IO   LE   POL

We study the impact of competition on information revelation in a class of Bayesian Persuasion games with multiple senders. Senders with no private information choose what information to gather and communicate to a receiver who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. The space of available signals includes all possible conditional distributions and allows any sender to choose a signal that is arbitrarily correlated with signals of others. We characterize the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria, and show that greater competition tends to increase the amount of information revealed.

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This paper was revised on April 10, 2015

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17436

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