NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Competition in Persuasion

Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica

NBER Working Paper No. 17436
Issued in September 2011
NBER Program(s):   IO   LE   POL

We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders’ preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.

download in pdf format
   (496 K)

email paper

This paper was revised on January 21, 2016

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17436

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Kamenica and Gentzkow w15540 Bayesian Persuasion
DellaVigna and Gentzkow w15298 Persuasion: Empirical Evidence
St. Paul w17431 Toward a Political Economy of Macroeconomic Thinking
Ottaviano w17433 Firm Heterogeneity, Endogenous Entry, and the Business Cycle
Bronnenberg, Dube, and Gentzkow w16267 The Evolution of Brand Preferences: Evidence from Consumer Migration
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Themes
Data
People
About

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us