NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Information Percolation in Segmented Markets

Darrell Duffie, Semyon Malamud, Gustavo Manso

NBER Working Paper No. 17295
Issued in August 2011
NBER Program(s):   AP

We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information quality, including initial information precision as well as market “connectivity,” the expected frequency of their trading opportunities. Investors with superior information sources attain strictly higher expected profits, provided their counterparties are unable to observe the quality of those sources. If, however, the quality of bidders’ information sources are commonly observable, then, under conditions, investors with superior information sources have strictly lower expected profits.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w17295

"Information Percolation in Segmented Markets" (with Semyon Malamud and Gustavo Manso), Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, Technical Appendices (published online only).

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