@techreport{NBERw16787,
 title = "Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession",
 author = "Santiago Carbo-Valverde and Edward J. Kane and Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "16787",
 year = "2011",
 month = "February",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w16787",
 abstract = {This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008.  Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove significantly larger for DFU firms in Europe and bailout decisions less driven by asset size than in the US. We also find that a proxy for regulatory capture helps to explain bailout decisions in Europe. A policy implication of our findings is that authorities could better contain safety-net benefits if they refocused their information systems on measuring volatility as well as capital.},
}