NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Deposit Insurance Without Commitment: Wall St. Versus Main St

Russell Cooper, Hubert Kempf

NBER Working Paper No. 16752
Issued in January 2011
NBER Program(s):   EFG

This paper studies the provision of deposit insurance without commitment in an economy with heterogenous households. When households are identical, deposit insurance will be provided ex post to reap insurance gains. But the ex post provision of deposit insurance redistributes consumption when households differ in their claims on the banking system as well as in their tax obligations to finance the deposit insurance. Deposit insurance will not be provided ex post if it requires a (socially) undesirable redistribution of consumption which outweighs insurance gains.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w16752

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