TY  - JOUR
AU  - Janvry,Alain de
AU  - Finan,Frederico
AU  - Sadoulet,Elisabeth
TI  - Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 16635
PY  - 2010
Y2  - December 2010
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16635
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w16635.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alain de Janvry
UC-Berkeley
207 Giannini Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-3310
E-Mail: alain@berkeley.edu

Frederico Finan
Department of Economics
University of California
508-1 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
Tel: 310/794-5958
Fax: 310/825-9528
E-Mail: ffinan@econ.berkeley.edu

Elisabeth Sadoulet
University of California at Berkeley;
207 Giannini Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-3310
E-Mail: sadoulet@are.berkeley.edu
AB  - This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program’s impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.
ER  -