@techreport{NBERw16391,
 title = "Are All Trade Protection Policies Created Equal?  Empirical Evidence for Nonequivalent Market Power Effects of Tariffs and Quotas",
 author = "Bruce Blonigen and Benjamin H. Liebman and Justin R. Pierce and Wesley W. Wilson",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "16391",
 year = "2010",
 month = "September",
 doi = {10.3386/w16391},
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w16391",
 abstract = {Over the past decades, the steel industry has been protected by a wide variety of trade policies, both tariff- and quota-based.  We exploit this extensive heterogeneity in trade protection to examine the well-established theoretical literature predicting nonequivalent effects of tariffs and quotas on domestic firms’ market power. Robust to a variety of empirical specifications with U.S. Census data on the population of U.S. steel plants from 1967-2002, we find evidence for significant market power effects for binding quota-based protection, but not for tariff-based protection.  There is only weak evidence that antidumping protection increases market power.},
}