@techreport{NBERw16318,
 title = "Analyzing the Welfare Impacts of Full-line Forcing Contracts",
 author = "Justin Ho and Katherine Ho and Julie Holland Mortimer",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "16318",
 year = "2010",
 month = "August",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w16318",
 abstract = {Theoretical investigations have examined both anti-competitive and efficiency-inducing rationales for vertical bundling, making empirical evidence important to understanding its welfare implications. We use an extensive dataset on full-line forcing contracts between movie distributors and video retailers to empirically measure the impact of vertical bundling on welfare. We identify and measure three primary effects of fullline forcing contracts: market coverage, leverage, and efficiency. We find that bundling increases market coverage and efficiency, but has little impact on one distributor gaining leverage over another. As a result, we estimate that full-line forcing contracts increased consumer and producer surplus in this application.},
}