NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives

Christoph Böhringer, Andreas Lange, Thomas F. Rutherford

NBER Working Paper No. 15899
Issued in April 2010
NBER Program(s):   EEE

Carbon control policies in OECD countries commonly differentiate emission prices in favor of energy-intensive industries. While leakage provides a efficiency argument for differential emission pricing, the latter may be a disguised beggar-thy-neighbor policy to exploit terms of trade. Using an optimal tax framework, we propose a method to decompose the leakage motive and the terms-of-trade motive for emission price differentiation. We illustrate our method with a quantitative impact assessment of unilateral climate policies for the U.S. and EU economies. We conclude in these instances that complex optimal emission price differentiation does not substantially reduce the overall economic costs of carbon abatement compared with a simple rule of uniform emission pricing.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w15899

Published: Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2014. "Optimal emission pricing in the presence of international spillovers: Decomposing leakage and terms-of-trade motives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 101-111. citation courtesy of

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