Optimal retirement benefit guarantees
NBER Working Paper No. 15805
---- Acknowledgements -----
I would like to thank Andrew Abel, Emmanuel Farhi, Michael Gallmeyer, Patrick Kehoe, Naryana Kocherlakota, Ali Lazrak, Nicholas Souleles and participants of seminars at Boston University, Columbia University, Carnegie Mellon University, Harvard University, the University of Lausanne, London School of Economics, the Minneapolis FED, MIT, the Philadelphia FED, Texas A&M, University of British Columbia, and the Wharton Finance faculty lunch for helpful comments and discussions. I would especially like to thank Jianfeng Yu for exceptional research assistance. Previous versions of this paper were circulated under the title "Optimal retirement benefit systems in the presence of moral hazard". The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.