TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alesina,Alberto F.
AU  - Algan,Yann
AU  - Cahuc,Pierre
AU  - Giuliano,Paola
TI  - Family Values and the Regulation of Labor
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15747
PY  - 2010
Y2  - February 2010
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15747
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15747.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Yann Algan
Department of Economics
Sciences Po
75007 Paris, France
28 rue des Saints-Pères 75007 Paris
France
E-Mail: yann.algan@sciences-po.org

Pïerre Cahuc
CREST, Ecole  Polytechnique
15 boulevard Gabriel Peri
92245 Malakoff Cedex, France
Tel: (33)1 41 17 37 17
E-Mail: cahuc@ensae.fr

Paola Giuliano
Anderson School of Management
UCLA
110 Westwood Plaza
C517 Entrepreneurs Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
Tel: 310/206-6890
Fax: 310/825-4011
E-Mail: paola.giuliano@anderson.ucla.edu
AB  - Flexible labor markets require geographically mobile workers to be efficient.  Otherwise, firms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents.  In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly.  Thus, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income.  Empirically, we do find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations.  There are also positive cross-country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities.  Finally, we find positive correlations between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty first century and family values prevailing before World War II, which suggests that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots.
ER  -