TY  - JOUR
AU  - Whalley,Alexander
TI  - Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15643
PY  - 2010
Y2  - January 2010
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15643
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15643.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alexander T. Whalley
School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts
University of California, Merced
5200 N. Lake Road
Merced, CA 95343
Tel: 209/228-4027
E-Mail: awhalley@ucmerced.edu
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 2010-05-01
AB  - This paper investigates whether methods of public official selection affect policymaking in cities. I draw on the unique characteristics of California's city referendum process to identify the causal effect of city treasurers' method of selection on their cities' debt management policies. I utilize a regression discontinuity strategy based on the effect of narrowly-passing appointive city treasurer referendums on city borrowing costs. The results indicate that appointive treasurers reduce a city's cost of borrowing by 13% to 23%. The results imply that if all cities in California with elected treasurers were to appoint them, total borrowing expenditures would be reduced by more than $20 million per year.  Appointive city treasurers appear to reduce borrowing costs primarily through the refinancing of expensive debt at lower interest rates.
ER  -