@techreport{NBERw15643,
 title = "Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers",
 author = "Alexander Whalley",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "15643",
 year = "2010",
 month = "January",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w15643",
 abstract = {This paper investigates whether methods of public official selection affect policymaking in cities. I draw on the unique characteristics of California's city referendum process to identify the causal effect of city treasurers' method of selection on their cities' debt management policies. I utilize a regression discontinuity strategy based on the effect of narrowly-passing appointive city treasurer referendums on city borrowing costs. The results indicate that appointive treasurers reduce a city's cost of borrowing by 13% to 23%. The results imply that if all cities in California with elected treasurers were to appoint them, total borrowing expenditures would be reduced by more than $20 million per year.  Appointive city treasurers appear to reduce borrowing costs primarily through the refinancing of expensive debt at lower interest rates.},
}