TY  - JOUR
AU  - Levitt,Steven D.
AU  - List,John A.
AU  - Sadoff,Sally E.
TI  - Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction Among Chess Players
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15610
PY  - 2009
Y2  - December 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15610
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15610.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Steven D. Levitt
Department of Economics
University of Chicago
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL  60637
Tel: 773/834-1862
Fax: 773/702-8490
E-Mail: slevitt@midway.uchicago.edu

John List
Department of Economics
University of Chicago
1126 East 59th
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 301/405-1288
Fax: 301/314-9091
E-Mail: jlist@uchicago.edu

Sally Sadoff
Rady School of Management
University of California San Diego
E-Mail: sadoff@uchicago.edu
AB  - Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct.  Much of this evidence, however, is generated using the Centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing the theory.  In this study, we analyze the play of world class chess players both in the centipede game and in another class of games – Race to 100 games – that are pure tests of backward induction.  We find that world class chess players behave like student subjects in the centipede game, virtually never playing the backward induction equilibrium  In the race to 100 games, in contrast, we find that many chess players properly backward induct.  Consistent with our claim that the Centipede game is not a useful test of backward induction, we find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games.
ER  -