TY  - JOUR
AU  - Moser,Petra
AU  - Voena,Alessandra
TI  - Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15598
PY  - 2009
Y2  - December 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15598
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15598.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Petra Moser
CASBS and Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel: 650-723-9303
Fax: (650) 725-5702
E-Mail: pmoser@stanford.edu

Alessandra Voena
Department of Economics
University of Chicago
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 773/702-9127
Fax: 773/702-8430
E-Mail: avoena@uchicago.edu
AB  - Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners.  This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.
ER  -