@techreport{NBERw15456,
 title = "High-Powered Incentives in Developing Country Health Insurance: Evidence from Colombia’s Régimen Subsidiado",
 author = "Grant Miller and Diana M. Pinto and Marcos Vera-Hernández",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "15456",
 year = "2009",
 month = "October",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w15456",
 abstract = {Despite current emphasis on health insurance expansions in developing countries, inefficient consumer incentives for over-use of medical care are an important counterbalancing concern. However, three factors that are more acute in poor countries (credit constraints, principal-agent problems, and positive externalities) result in substantial under-use and misuse as well. This paper studies Colombia’s Régimen Subsidiado, the first major developing country effort to expand insurance in a way that purposefully addresses these inefficiencies. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that Colombia’s insurance program has provided risk protection while substantially increasing the use of traditionally under-utilized preventive services (with measurable health gains) through high-powered supply-side incentives.},
}