NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Executive Compensation: Facts

Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas F. Cooley

NBER Working Paper No. 15426
Issued in October 2009
NBER Program(s):   CF

In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of equity grants has increased; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock has increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way.

download in pdf format
   (784 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (784 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w15426

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Weisbach w12798 Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation"
Abowd and Kaplan w7124 Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering
Frydman and Jenter w16585 CEO Compensation
Bebchuk and Fried w9813 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Frydman and Molloy w14145 Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us