TY - JOUR AU - Alston,Lee J. AU - Harris,Edwyna AU - Mueller,Bernardo TI - De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 15264 PY - 2009 Y2 - September 2009 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15264 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15264.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Lee J. Alston Institutions Program Institute of Behavioral Science Department of Economics University of Colorado at Boulder Boulder, CO 80309-0483 Tel: 303/492-4257 Fax: 303/492 2151 E-Mail: Lee.Alston@colorado.edu Edwyna Harris Monash University E-Mail: Edwyna.Harris@BusEco.monash.edu.au Bernardo Mueller SQN 215 Bloco C Apt 609 Brasilia, DF, 70874-030 Brazil Tel: 55 61 8111-0349 E-Mail: bmueller@unb.br AB - We present a conceptual framework to better understand the interaction between settlement and the emergence of de facto property rights on frontiers prior to governments establishing and enforcing de jure property rights. In this framework, potential rents associated with more exclusivity drives “demand” for commons arrangements but demand is not a sufficient explanation; norms and politics matter. At some point enhanced scarcity will drive demand for more exclusivity beyond which can be sustained with commons arrangements. Claimants will therefore petition government for de jure property rights to their claims – formal titles. Land conflict will be minimal when governments supply property rights to first possessors. But, governments may not allocate de jure rights to these claimants because they face differing political constituencies. Moreover, governments may assign de jure rights but be unwilling to enforce the right. This generates potential or actual conflict over land depending on the violence potentials of de facto and de jure claimants. We examine land settlement and conflict on the frontiers of Australia, the U.S. and Brazil. We are interested in examining the emergence, sustainability, and collapse of commons arrangements in specific historical contexts. Our analysis indicates the emergence of de facto property rights arrangements will be relatively peaceful where claimants have reasons to organize collectively (Australia and the U.S.). The settlement process will be more prone to conflict when fewer collective activities are required. Consequently, claimants resort to periodic violent self-enforcement or third party enforcement (Brazil). In all three cases the movement from de facto to de jure property rights led to potential or actual conflict because of insufficient government enforcement. ER -