Insulation Impossible: Fiscal Spillovers in a Monetary Union

Russell Cooper, Hubert Kempf, Dan Peled

NBER Working Paper No. 15176
Issued in July 2009
NBER Program(s):   EFG

This paper studies fiscal spillovers in a monetary union. The focus of the analysis is on the interaction between the fiscal policy of member countries (regions) and the central monetary authority. When capital markets are integrated, the fiscal policy of one country will influence equilibrium wages and interest rates. Thus there are fiscal spillovers within a federation. The magnitude and direction of these spillovers, in particular the presence of a crowding out effect, can be influenced by the choice of monetary policy rules. We find that there does not exist a monetary policy rule which completely insulates agents in one region from fiscal policy in another. Some familiar policy rules, such as pegging an interest rate, can provide partial insulation.

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This paper was revised on December 5, 2011

Acknowledgments

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