NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem

Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard T. Holden

NBER Working Paper No. 15167
Issued in July 2009

---- Acknowledgements -----

We owe special thanks to Oliver Hart for numerous discussions, and to Johannes Horner and Andy Skrzypacz for pointing out an error in a previous version. We are also grateful to Mathias Dewatripont, Bob Gibbons, Philippe Jehiel, John Moore, Roger Myerson, Andrew Postlewaite, Olivier Tercieux, Jean Tirole, Ivan Werning and Muhamet Yildiz for helpful discussions and comments. Michael Powell provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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