TY  - JOUR
AU  - Law,Marc T.
AU  - Hansen,Zeynep K.
TI  - Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and Physician Discipline: An Empirical Analysis
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15140
PY  - 2009
Y2  - July 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15140
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15140.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Marc Law
Department of Economics
University of Vermont
94 University Place
Burlington, VT  05405-0114
E-Mail: Marc.Law@uvm.edu

Zeynep K. Hansen
College of Business and Economics
Department of Economics
Boise State University
1910 University Drive
Boise, ID 83725-1620
Tel: 208/426-3314
Fax: 208/426-2071
E-Mail: zeynephansen@boisestate.edu
AB  - This paper investigates the relationship between the characteristics of medical licensing boards and the frequency with which boards discipline physicians. Specifically, we take advantage of variation in the structure of medical licensing boards between 1993 and 2003 to determine the effect of organizational and budgetary independence, public oversight, and resource constraints on rates of physician discipline. We find that larger licensing boards, boards with more staff, and boards that are organizationally independent from state government discipline doctors more frequently. Public oversight and political control over board budgets do not appear to influence the extent to which medical licensing boards discipline doctors. These findings are broadly consistent with theories of regulatory behavior that emphasize the importance of bureaucratic autonomy for effective regulatory enforcement.
ER  -