A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs
A search-theoretic model of the retail market for illegal drugs is developed. Trade occurs in bilateral, potentially long-lived matches between sellers and buyers. Buyers incur search costs when experimenting with a new seller. Moral hazard is present because buyers learn purity only after a trade is made. The model produces testable implications regarding the distribution of purity offered in equilibrium, and the duration of the relationships between buyers and sellers. These predictions are consistent with available data. The effectiveness of different enforcement strategies is evaluated, including some novel ones which leverage the moral hazard present in the market.
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Copy CitationManolis Galenianos, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, and Nicola Persico, "A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," NBER Working Paper 14980 (2009), https://doi.org/10.3386/w14980.Download Citation
Published Versions
Manolis Galenianos & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula & Nicola Persico, 2012. "A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 1239-1269. citation courtesy of 
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