TY  - JOUR
AU  - Lee,Robin S.
AU  - Schwarz,Michael
TI  - Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14922
PY  - 2009
Y2  - April 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14922
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14922.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Robin S.. Lee
NYU Stern, Department of Economics
44 West 4th Street, KMC 7-78
New York, NY 10012
Tel: 6464348545
E-Mail: rslee@stern.nyu.edu

Michael Schwarz
Yahoo! Research
2397 Shattuck Ave
Berkeley, CA 94704
Fax: 510/704-2401
E-Mail: mschwarz@yahoo-inc.com
AB  - We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition.  Agents may learn preferences over partners via costly interviews. Although there exist multiple equilibria where all agents receive the same number of interviews, efficiency depends on overlap -- the number of common interview partners among agents.  We prove the equilibria with the highest degree of overlap yields the highest probability of being matched.  The analysis suggests that institutions which ration interviews or create labor market segmentation may lead to greater efficiency in information acquisition activities.
ER  -