NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Robin S. Lee, Michael Schwarz

NBER Working Paper No. 14922
Issued in April 2009
NBER Program(s):   LS

We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion, and prove that unemployment is minimized with perfect overlap: i.e., if two firms interview any common worker, they interview the exact same set of workers.

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This paper was revised on March 17, 2017

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14922

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