TY  - JOUR
AU  - Abdulkadiroglu,Atila
AU  - Pathak,Parag A.
AU  - Roth,Alvin E.
TI  - Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14864
PY  - 2009
Y2  - April 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14864
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14864.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
Duke University
Department of Economics
Durham, NC 27708
E-Mail: atila.abdulkadiroglu@duke.edu

Parag Pathak
MIT Department of Economics
50 Memorial Drive
E52-391C
Cambridge, MA 02142
Tel: 617/253-7458
E-Mail: ppathak@mit.edu

Alvin E. Roth
Harvard University
Department of Economics
Littauer 308
Cambridge, MA 02138-3001
Tel: 617/496-6009 (econ)
Fax: 617/495-6537
E-Mail: aroth@hbs.edu
AB  - The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
ER  -