@techreport{NBERw14864,
 title = "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match",
 author = "Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "14864",
 year = "2009",
 month = "April",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w14864",
 abstract = {The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.},
}