NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth

NBER Working Paper No. 14864
Issued in April 2009
NBER Program(s):   ED   PE

The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w14864

Published: Abdulkadiro─člu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review, 99(5): 1954-78.

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