Procurement Contracting with Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence
NBER Working Paper No. 14855
---- Acknowledgments ----
We are grateful to Saeid Asgari, Bassem Barsoum, Matthew Cugini, Perry Mayer, Mark Samuelson, Raymond Tritt and Steven Whipple of Caltrans; Rabinder Bains, Tom Ravn and Gus Wagner of Mn/DOT and David Kent of NYSDOT for their help with this paper and related projects. We would also like to thank John Asker, Susan Athey, Matt Gentzkow, Ken Hendricks, Jon Levin, Justin Marion, Ariel Pakes, Chad Syverson; seminar participants at Harvard, LSE, MIT, Toronto, UC Davis and Wisconsin; and participants at the AEA, CAPCP, IIOC, Stony Brook, UBC IO, WBEC and the NBER IO / Market Design / PE conferences for useful comments and suggestions. Lou Argentieri, Jorge Alvarez, Minjung Kim, Jason Kriss, Tom Longwell, Tina Marsh, Maryam Saeedi, Connan Snider and Hao Teng provided excellent research assistance. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge support from the NSF (grant no. SES-0924371). The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.